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I. INTRODUCTION

Up until the 1970s, indeterminate sentencing dominated sentencing in
the United States.1 This model implied a focus on offender rehabilitation,
with the concomitant need for individualized treatment.2 The American
Law Institute’s (ALI) Model Penal Code (MPC), published in 1962,
incorporated these assumptions, though in contrast to its General Part, the
MPC’s sentencing provisions failed to attract adherents during the
substantial revisions of state and federal sentencing laws, which started in
the mid-1970s.3 As rehabilitation has fallen into disrepute and prison
populations have skyrocketed,4 other sentencing goals have taken center
* Dean and Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law. B.A., Bates College; J.D.,
Yale Law School; LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center. I am grateful for the excellent
research support by Micah Snitzer, Hofstra Law ‘09, and the unfailing assistance of Hofstra Law’s
Reference/Government Documents Librarian Tricia Kasting. I deeply appreciate Professor Chris
Slobogin’s invitation to participate in the Symposium, and Professor Kevin Reitz’s ever cheerful
and gracious acceptance of any criticism.
1. Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 895–97 (1990).
2. Id.
3. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, Reporter’s Introductory Memorandum xxviii
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007).
4. Theodore Caplow & Jonathan Simon, Understanding Prison Policy and Population
777

778

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

stage. The federal sentencing system, with its ill-regarded guideline
regime, appears largely built on retribution and incapacitation,5 which,
together with the politicization of crime, have contributed to a dramatic
build-up in the federal prison population. Most states have also witnessed a
substantial increase in their prison populations6 while struggling to control
the resulting expenditures and overcrowding. Between the state and federal
prison populations, the United States has an unprecedentedly large prison
system, maintaining the highest number of prisoners in the world.7
The current approaches to sentencing and corrections are based on four
different models: indeterminate sentencing, comprehensive structured
sentencing, community/restorative justice, and comprehensive risk-based
systems.8 Any systemic classification should not only include the
sentencing process—including the existence of guideline regimes and
mandatory minimums—but also the back-end process, such as the scope of
good time and parole release.9 In many state sentencing systems, much
back-end discretion continues to be exercised through corrections
administrators.10
One of the ways in which prison administrators exercise discretion is
through the award of “good conduct time,” or “good time.”11 The
Trends, in 26 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH—PRISONS 63, 73–76 (Michael Tonry &
Joan Petersilia eds., 1999).
5. Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding and Using
the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 19, 23–24 (2003)
(stating that use of “rational reconstruction” indicates a “modified just desert” philosophy of
punishment, which blends punishment proportionate to the seriousness of the crime and
incapacitation, dominates the federal sentencing guidelines). But see Aaron J. Rappaport,
Unprincipled Punishment: The U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Troubling Silence About the
Purposes of Punishment, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1043–46 (2003) (asking that the U.S. Sentencing
Commission develop a coherent sentencing philosophy).
6. See generally HEATHER C. WEST & WILLIAM J. SABOL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
J USTICE S TATISTICS , P RISONERS IN 2007, at 1 (2008) (analyzing data from the National
Prisoner Statistics program for state and federal prison populations from 2006 to 2007),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p.07.pdf. For more dramatic comparisons of
incarceration growth over the last twenty-five years, see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE
PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, INCARCERATION RATE, 1980–2007, chart at 1, available
at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/glance/incrt.htm (last visited July 14, 2009).
7. THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, PUBLIC SAFETY PERFORMANCE PROJECT, PUBLIC SAFETY,
PUBLIC SPENDING: FORECASTING AMERICA’S PRISON POPULATION 2007–2011, at 1 (2007), available
at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/State-based_policy/PSPP_
prison_projections_0207.pdf.
8. MICHAEL TONRY, THE FRAGMENTATION OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS IN AMERICA 3
(1999), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/175721.pdf.
9. MICHAEL TONRY, RECONSIDERING INDETERMINATE AND STRUCTURED SENTENCING 2
(1999), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/175722.pdf.
10. Kay A. Knapp, Allocation of Discretion and Accountability Within Sentencing Structures,
64 U. COLO. L. REV. 679, 681–82 (1993).
11. Id. at 682.
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availability of such time varies widely between sentencing systems.12 In the
course of different drafts, the ALI’s proposed Model Penal Code:
Sentencing has also suggested a widely varying percentage discount for
good conduct and program participation. While increased good time carries
the risk of administrative discretion, it is of crucial importance in a regime
in which long sentences appear to continue unabated because good time
will assure appropriate prison conduct and guarantee a limited form of
relief and hope to inmates. Equally important, the enhanced focus on
community re-entry upon release mandates that rehabilitation begin upon
entry into the prison system.13 Program participation, including drug abuse
and educational programs, and the adoption of work-related values through
participation in correctional employment suggest the appropriateness of a
reward in the form of decreased sentence length. Undoubtedly, good time
could and should be re-thought if the length of United States prison
sentences and the rate of imprisonment were to fall.
This Article explains the changing assumptions behind sentencing since
the initial issuance of the MPC, the purposes of good time in sentencing
and post-sentencing, and addresses good time in light of existing
sentencing regimes at federal and state levels. As well, this Article
discusses the Model Penal Code: Sentencing’s approach to good time and
proposes the adoption of a more extensive and differently structured good
time regime than currently proposed in the ALI’s Sentencing Draft.
II. HOW ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT SENTENCING HAVE CHANGED:
FROM THE MPC TO THE MPC: SENTENCING
Drafted in the 1950s and ultimately adopted in 1962, the MPC
subscribed to indeterminate sentencing, with its focus on rehabilitation and
individualization of treatment.14 The MPC’s eight purposes of sentencing
included “the correction and rehabilitation of offenders.”15 Rehabilitative
goals assured at least the promise of enhanced governmental funding of
programs that allowed offenders to improve and advance themselves.16 The
MPC’s sentencing provisions and back-end measures, including parole and
good time, reflected its focus on rehabilitative efforts and offenders’
perceived treatment needs. Good time was suggested at six days per month
for “good behavior and faithful performance of duties,” with another six
12. Id. at 685–86.
13. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, Reporter’s Note 25–26 (Tentative Draft No.
1, 2007); MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING 25–26 (Discussion Draft, 2006).
14. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES: PART I, §§ 6.01 to 7.09, at 2–3 (1985); see also
MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, Reporter’s Introductory Memorandum xxviii-xxix (Tentative
Draft No. 1, 2007).
15. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 1.02(2)(b) (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1985); see also MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2), at 2 (Tentative Draft No. 1,
2007).
16. TONRY, supra note 9, at 5.
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days to be awarded for “meritorious behavior or exceptional performance
of his [or her] duties.”17 Most prisoners would have received 20% good
time under the MPC’s original good time provision. The credits would
have applied to the minimum term, advancing parole eligibility, and would
have applied to the maximum term, advancing mandatory release.18
Subsequent sentencing reform has focused on shifting sentencing
discretion from the back-end, where it rested with parole officials and
prison administrators, to the front-end, where it rests with the judiciary.19
In addition, such reforms have focused on “truth in sentencing.”20 While
“truth in sentencing” has multiple meanings, one of its usages emphasizes
the “close correspondence between the pronounced sentence and time
served,”21 which also leads to greater predictability for the inmate and the
public. Admittedly, predictability can also be achieved while disparity
between the sentence imposed and the time served occurs.22
The ALI’s Model Penal Code: Sentencing builds on these newer
sentencing approaches. Its purposes “overlay[] limits of proportionality
upon the pursuit of utilitarian goals.” It recommends the creation of
permanent state sentencing commissions and provides for sufficient
judicial discretion to individualize sentences.23 In its current version, the
Model Penal Code: Sentencing limits good time to 15% to prevent
increased back-end discretion.24
III. “GOOD TIME”
“Good time” reduces the actual time a defendant sentenced to prison
serves—usually because he has complied with prison rules and
regulations.25 Because good time may amount to a substantial sentence
reduction, it is valuable to inmates.26 The value of good time is also
reflected in the ex post facto protection against a decrease in good time
through legislation enacted after the date of the offender’s sentencing.27
Another indication of its value includes the due process protections that
accompany the loss of good time.28
17. MODEL PENAL CODE § 305.1 (1962).
18. TONRY, supra note 9, at 4.
19. Knapp, supra note 10, at 684.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 685.
22. Id.
23. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, Reporter’s Introductory Memorandum xxx-xxxi
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007).
24. Id.
25. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1521 (8th ed. 2004).
26. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 561 (1974) (“The deprivation of good time is
unquestionably a matter of considerable importance.”).
27. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 25, 36 (1981).
28. See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
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Good time has frequently been classified in four different ways. First
and most traditionally, it can be awarded for good prison conduct, which
usually implies mere compliance with prison rules and regulations and
avoidance of disciplinary infractions. Frequently, correctional systems
“assume [such] good time credit will automatically accrue to eligible
inmates.”29 Therefore, it is often referred to as statutory good time.30
Second, there may be a separate award of good time for successful
participation in prison programs.31 In this case “good time” is often
referred to as “earned time.”32 Third, good time may be granted for
extraordinary achievements or service, which may include participation in
drug experiments, donation of blood, or saving a corrections official during
a riot.33 Only occasionally do states provide for such meritorious good
time.34
Fourth and finally, some state prison systems have used good time
largely as a population management tool, designed to alleviate the pressure
emanating from overcrowding.35 In that case, “[e]mergency release credit
is [] available . . . as a contingency to manage overcrowding.”36 Good
conduct deductions are awarded to the inmate in such situations solely for
“staying out of trouble.”37 In the early 1980s Michigan and Iowa both
authorized early releases once their prison populations had reached a
certain level. In some states, prisoners served increasingly less time
because of a combination of generous good-time and emergency releases.38
In the early 1990s, using this approach, Texas released offenders after
having served on average only 13% of the sentence imposed.39 During the
same time, North Carolina offenders served less than 20% of their
29. Dora Schriro, Is Good Time a Good Idea? A Practitioner’s Perspective, 21 FED. SENT’G
REP. 179–81 (2009).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. James B. Jacobs, Sentencing by Prison Personnel: Good Time, 30 UCLA L. REV. 217,
221 (1982).
34. Schriro, supra note 29, at 179.
35. STATE OF CAL. LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, SOLVING CALIFORNIA’S CORRECTIONS CRISIS:
TIME IS RUNNING OUT 25 (Jan. 25, 2007), available at http://www.lhc.ca.gov/lhcdir/185/Report18
5.pdf [hereinafter SOLVING CALIFORNIA’S CORRECTIONS CRISIS].
36. Schriro, supra note 29, at 179.
37. SOLVING CALIFORNIA’S CORRECTIONS CRISIS, supra note 35, at 25. Other administrative
ways to control prison overcrowding include work release and pre-release. Knapp, supra note 10, at
682.
38. Judith Greene, Getting Tough on Crime: The History and Political Context of Sentencing
Reform Developments Leading to the Passage of the 1994 Crime Act, in Sentencing and Society:
International Perspectives 43, 51 (Cyrus Tata & Neil Hutton, eds., 1998).
39. Knapp, supra note 10, at 681 n.9; see also Carl Reynolds, Sentencing and Corrections:
From Crowding to Equilibrium (and Back Again?), 69 TEX. B.J. 232, 233 (2006) (stating that in its
pursuit of a (partial) solution to overcrowding, the State of Texas engaged in substantial prison
building throughout the 1990s).
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sentences.40 Not surprisingly, attendant headlines resulted in widespread
public frustration with sentencing.41 As a consequence, many states
dramatically curtailed the discretion of prison officials to award sentence
reductions or to move prisoners early into less restrictive confinement for
program participation or work.42
Ideally, good conduct should connote rehabilitation on the part of the
prisoner and at the same time improve safety in prisons as an incentive for
lawful behavior. In addition, an increasing number of those focused on
public safety view good time as a way to “match[] pre-release requirements
to an individual inmate’s future propensity for crime.”43 The Preliminary
Draft to the Model Penal Code: Sentencing indicates that all inmates
should have access to good time, based on any of the first three
categories.44
A. Purposes of Good Time
Key policy issues in determining the award of good time include the
amount of good time, the types of offenders eligible for such deductions,
and the requirements attached to good time.45
Good time may serve a host of purposes. First, good time can provide
an incentive for participation in educational, work, drug, or other types of
programs.46 Correction officials have stated that “prisons are safer, more
orderly, and more productive when inmates participate in programs.”47
Programming may enhance rehabilitation. Successful participation in the
federal government’s Residential Drug Abuse Program (RDAP), for
example, reduces recidivism.48 Second, “productive work programs permit
inmates . . . to begin to repay their debt to society.”49 Finally, good time
can incentivize compliance with prison rules or perhaps even exemplary
behavior. Such compliance makes it possible for the institution to function
40. Knapp, supra note 10, at 681 n.9.
41. PIERCE O’DONNELL ET AL., TOWARD A JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM: AGENDA
FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM 70 (1977).
42. DEAN J. CHAMPION, MEASURING OFFENDER RISK: A CRIMINAL JUSTICE SOURCEBOOK 58
(1993).
43. Schriro, supra note 29, at 179.
44. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.1 (1962).
45. BERT USEEM ET AL., INST. FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH UNIV. OF N.M., SENTENCING MATTERS,
BUT DOES GOOD TIME MATTER MORE? 3 (1996).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, DRUG TREATMENT PROJECTS:
TRIAD DRUG TREATMENT EVALUATION PROJECT, available at http://www.bop.gov/news/research_
projects/published_reports/drug_treat/oretriad.jsp (last visited July 20, 2009) (demonstrating that
RDAP participants’ recidivism rates were lower than those of comparable former inmates); NEIL P.
LANGAN & BERNADETTE M.M. PELISSIER, THE EFFECT OF DRUG TREATMENT ON INMATE
MISCONDUCT IN FEDERAL PRISONS 11 (2002).
49. USEEM ET AL., supra note 45, at 3.
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more smoothly. For that reason, most states allow for good time, at least
for most offenders. However, “[n]o one knows whether, or in what
measure, a reduction in good time will produce greater disorder behind
bars.”50 States without good time do not appear to experience more
frequent prison riots than those with good time.51
Good time may be used selectively. It may, for example, be restricted to
non-violent offenders. While such a rule may enhance public safety by
keeping violent offenders in prison longer, it could also create less
compliance with prison rules and a perception of unfairness and inequality.
In addition, this type of binary distinction may be too blunt to achieve its
purpose.52 Some argue that instead of using such a crude distinction, good
time should be awarded based on custody level.53 In turn, improvements in
confinement or in custody level, rather than a time deduction, may result
from enhanced compliance.54
Good time may also decrease sentence severity, assuming judges and
juries do not increase the sentence to account for the good time reduction.55
Finally, good time undermines the goals of “truth-in-sentencing,” as the
sentence served will not be close to the sentence imposed.56 This may only
be a minor problem if the amount of good time is relatively limited, but
may be quite dramatic in day-for-day systems, especially if those systems
also have a generous parole regime.
In both federal and state systems, most inmates are awarded the entire
available amount of good time. One may draw one of two conclusions:
Either the good time system is effective in assuring compliance with prison
rules, or good time is ineffective because prison policies are either too lax
or insufficiently enforced.57 For practical reasons, in large prison systems,
there is “an inexorable tendency for statutory and meritorious good time to
be awarded automatically.”58 Some have suggested that good time should
not be awarded for mere failure to run afoul of rules or solely for
participation in work programs, but instead should assess actual
rehabilitation. If such awards were to be based on rehabilitative progress,
50. Id. at 4.
51. Jacobs, supra note 33, at 259.
52. USEEM ET AL., supra note 45, at 4–5.
53. Id. at 5–6.
54. Schriro, supra note 29, at 181 (describing Arizona’s program which uses “[e]ach inmate’s
successful completion of individualized pre-release plans [as] the basis for earning improved
conditions of confinement”).
55. USEEM ET AL., supra note 45, at 6. Cf. O’DONNELL ET AL., supra note 41, at 56 (suggesting
need for decreased sentence length when limiting good time to a one-time maximum ten percent
sentence reduction); Jacobs, supra note 33, at 221.
56. See USEEM ET AL., supra note 45, at 6.
57. Id. at 7. At least for New Mexico’s prison system, correction officials claimed to strictly
enforce good time policies and considered them “a key management tool.” Id. at 10.
58. Jacobs, supra note 33, at 225.
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however, the assessment would require an effective measure of such
progress, which appears virtually impossible. In addition, substantially
more personnel would be needed for these assessments.59
Others argue for evidence-based rehabilitative programs which bring
about necessary cognitive changes.60 While some such programs are
available, they also need to target the appropriate offender.61 Despite
increasing knowledge about appropriate programming, state and federal
good time rules often operate on outdated assumptions or seem to be
driven by political concerns.
B. Federal “Good Time”
In the federal system “good time” is earned for “satisfactory behavior,”
which is defined as “exemplary compliance with institutional disciplinary
regulations.”62 Good time is available to any prisoner sentenced to a nonlife term longer than one year.63 The prisoner may receive credit of up to
fifty-four days, which is awarded at the end of each year of
imprisonment.64 Good time available to prisoners sentenced after 1996
depends on whether they have “earned, or [are] making satisfactory
progress toward earning, a high school diploma or an equivalent degree.”65
If that is not the case, the statutorily available maximum good time per year
served is capped at forty-two days.66
59. See USEEM ET AL., supra note 45, at 11–12.
60. While research on the success of prison treatment remains sparse, the literature supports
the claim that carefully targeted programs will decrease recidivism. Further detailed studies and
meta-analysis remain necessary. See Gerald G. Gaes et al., Adult Correctional Treatment, in 26
CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH—PRISONS 361, 415 (Michael Tonry & Joan Petersilia
eds., 1999).
61. See generally Schriro, supra note 29, at 180 (providing examples of various states’
policies).
62. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (2006).
63. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305:1 (1962). Inmates with a sentence of 365 days or
less do not earn any good time. Id.
64. Id. The military system also allows for good time credit, with a maximum good time
allowance of 10 days per month. In addition, extra good time credit is available for work
assignments, with a maximum of seven days per month. Jeff Walker, The Practical Consequences
of a Court-Martial Conviction, ARMY LAW., Dec. 2001, 1, 4–5.
65. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305:1 (1962). If the offense was committed prior to
November 1, 1987, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4161–66 (repealed 1987) governs good time. See U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, LEGAL RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS
2008, at 14 (2008), available at http://ndqq-defender.org/static/resources/BOP%20Legal%20Re
source%220Guide%202008.pdf. Inmates are eligible for both statutory and extra good time. Id. at
15. The former can be forfeited either in its entirety or partially “if the prisoner violates institution
rules or commits any offense.” Id.
66. The change in maximum good time per year resulted from the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (PLRA), which went into effect April 26, 1996. 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e) (2006); see also Families
Against Mandatory Minimums (FAMM), Frequently Asked Questions About Federal Good Time
Credit (2008), available at http://www.famm.org/Repository/Files/Final_Good_Time_FAQs_10.2
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The Bureau of Prisons’ (BOP) Designation and Sentence Computation
Center is responsible for all good time calculations of federal inmates held
in BOP facilities; those held in private prisons have their good time
computed by the individual facilities.67 There should, however, be no
difference in result.
One of the most disputed issues pertaining to federal good time is the
way in which the BOP calculates it.68 Since the BOP deducts good time
from the days actually served by the prisoner rather than the sentence
imposed by the judge, the maximum amount of good time per year is
effectively forty-seven days.69 Courts have deferred to the BOP’s
calculation of good time as agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute.70
The fifty-four day rule arose from the construction of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines in 1987.71 The guideline ranges are 15% longer than
the time Congress intended for prisoners to stay incarcerated.72 This meant
that prisoners should serve only 85% of the sentences imposed.73 The fiftyfour days amount to almost exactly 15%.74
1.08%581%50.pdf [hereinafter FAMM, FAQs]. The PLRA good time rule covers all inmates
convicted after that date. 42 U.S.C. §1997(e) (2006); FAMM, FAQs, supra; see also U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, PROGRAM STATEMENT: GOOD CONDUCT TIME UNDER THE
PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT, P 5884.03 (2006), available at http://www.bop.gov/policy/prog
stat/5884_003.pdf.
67. See FAMM, FAQs, supra note 66, at 2.
68. Stephen R. Sady & Lynn Deffebach, The Sentencing Commission, The Bureau of Prisons,
and the Need for Full Implementation of Existing Ameliorative Statutes to Address Unwarranted
and Unauthorized Over-Incarceration 2–9 (2008), available at http://www.rashkind.com/alterna
tives/dir_04/Sady_Over-Incarceration.pdf. Stephen R. Sady, Misinterpretation of the Federal Good
Time Statute Costs Prisoners Seven Days Every Year, CHAMPION 12 (Sept./Oct. 2002). Other
concerns include the calculation of good time credit for concurrent sentences. See Stephen R. Sady
& Lynn Deffebach, Grid & Bear It, 31 CHAMPION 56 (May 2007).
69. See FAMM, FAQs, supra note 66, at 3–6.
70. See, e.g., Tablada v. Thomas, 533 F.3d 800, 809 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that BOP
violated Administrative Procedure Act by failing to articulate a rational basis for its interpretation of
good time, but upholding the interpretation as reasonable nonetheless); Bernitt v. Martinez, 432
F.3d 868, 869 (8th Cir. 2005); Sash v. Zenk, 428 F.3d 132, 136–37 (2d Cir. 2005); Petty v. Stine,
424 F.3d 509, 510 (6th Cir. 2005); Brown v. McFadden, 416 F.3d 1271, 1272–73 (11th Cir. 2005);
Yi v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 412 F.3d 526, 534 (4th Cir. 2005); O’Donald v. Johns, 402 F.3d 172,
174 (3d Cir. 2005); Perez-Olivo v. Chavez, 394 F.3d 45, 52–53 n.6 (1st Cir. 2005); PachecoCamacho v. Hood, 272 F.3d 1266, 1270–71 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that BOP’s calculation of
good time was reasonable). Cf. Moreland v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 431 F.3d 180, 186 (5th Cir.
2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1106 (2006) (finding statute to be unambiguously referencing “time
served”). In Moreland, Justice Stevens wrote a concurrence to the denial of the grant of certiorari,
suggesting that Congress clarify the statute as it had done once before in 1959 when the same issue
arose and Congress “und[id] a judicial determination that credit should be based on time served
rather than on the sentence imposed.” Id. at 1907 (Stevens, J., concurring).
71. FAMM, FAQs, supra note 66, at 7.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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Congress replicated the 85% rule in the 1994 Violent Crime Control
and Law Enforcement Act, which created a “Truth in Sentencing” (TIS)
grant program for states.75 The TIS legislation provides funding to states to
increase their capacity to house violent offenders if those states either
require violent offenders to serve at least 85% of the sentence imposed, or
increase the percentage of violent felons sentenced to prison, increase their
average time served, increase the percentage of the sentence served by
incarcerated violent offenders, and have laws in effect that require those
with one or more prior federal or state convictions of a violent crime or
serious drug offense to serve at least 85% of the sentence imposed.76 The
consequence of TIS legislation has been that an offender serves a much
longer period of time than before.77
In the federal system, previously proposed legislation would have
increased good time up to sixty days per year for federal inmates if they
satisfactorily earned a high school diploma, a GED, or “certification
through an accredited vocational training program, college, or
university.”78 Inmates would also have earned the maximum good time if
they had completed “interventional rehabilitation programs, including
mental health and drug abuse programs.”79 Sole responsibility for awarding
the good time would have rested with the BOP.80
The bill was designed in part to increase the BOP’s accountability for
programming that leads to better re-entry. As some have written, the
proposed legislation pursued three goals: “to promote public safety by
offering constructive incentives for exemplary institutional adjustment,” to
“increas[e] educational standards” and to “decreas[e] the overall cost of
corrections.”81 Some research, however, indicates that institutional
adjustment and recidivism are relatively unrelated because prisons are an
artificial environment.82 Therefore, compliance with prison rules may in
fact be counterproductive to successful re-entry. When an inmate
75. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 20101(a), 108 Stat. 1796, 1816 (1994); 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 13701–02 (West 2007). For a detailed
background on the legislation, see Greene, supra note 38, at 55–62.
76. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 20102(a)(2)(D), 108 Stat. 1796, 1816 (1994). For allocation of funding, see 42 U.S.C. § 13708
(2006).
77. PAULA M. DITTON & DORIS JAMES WILSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, TRUTH IN SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS 1, 14 (1999), available at http://www.ojp.us
doj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/tssp.pdf.
78. Literacy, Education, and Rehabilitation Act (LERA), H.R. 4283, 110th Cong. § 2(a) (1st
Sess. 2007) [hereinafter LERA]. The bill was originally introduced by Congressman Scott in 2005.
See H.R. 3602, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005).
79. LERA § 2(a).
80. Id.
81. Posting of Jeralyn Merritt to Talk Left: the Politics of Crime, http://www.talkleft.com
(Oct. 21, 2003, 05:39 EST).
82. Jacobs, supra note 33, at 264–65.
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participates in a program to gain release, such a decision does not
necessarily reflect moral growth or rehabilitation. More disturbingly, it
may be solely indicative of successful functioning in an artificially
controlled environment, rather than be predictive of success in a less
structured setting. While all prisons require a certain structure and control,
rehabilitative programs and especially work programs also need to allow
for increasing choices to replicate life on the outside more accurately.
Increased education standards will only be meaningful to inmates upon
release if the standards lead to (better) employment. For that reason,
institutional educational opportunities should be constructed carefully. Any
shorter imprisonment, even with enhanced programming, will be costeffective, assuming that more inmates are not returned to prison for
violations committed during supervised release or for more offenses
committed over their lifetime.
Recidivism studies indicate that certain good time programs can both
enhance public safety and save costs.83 Through the transmission of skills
and application of such skills, successful programs bring about cognitive
transformation. However, not all program options are created equal as
static factors may play a crucial role in an individual’s chances for program
success. Static factors include the type of crime committed, prior criminal
history, prior employment history, and a history of substance abuse.84
In 1989, the BOP introduced its first residential drug and alcohol abuse
treatment program as a pilot.85 Today, the Residential Drug Abuse Program
(RDAP)86 awards up to one year of sentence reduction for participating
non-violent offenders.87 The number of inmates who volunteered originally
83. See, e.g., Schriro, supra note 29, at 179–81.
84. Id. at 180.
85. See BERNADETTE PELISSIER ET AL., FEDERAL PRISON RESIDENTIAL DRUG TREATMENT
REDUCES SUBSTANCE USE AND ABUSE AFTER RELEASE 3–4, available at
http://www.bop.gov/news/research_projects/published_reports/recidivism/orepramjalcd.pdf (last
visited July 14, 2009) (noting that development of residential substance abuse programs occurred
following a conference held in 1988). Alan Ellis, J. Michael Henderson & James H. Feldman, Jr.,
Reducing Recidivism: The Bureau of Prisons Comprehensive Residential Drug Abuse Program,
CHAMPION, July 2006, at 36, 36.
86. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e) (2006).
87. Id. Those convicted of a “crime of violence,” which the BOP interprets as including the
possession of a weapon, may participate in RDAP, but are excluded from early release. See THE
2009 CRIM. JUSTICE TRANSITION COAL., SMART ON CRIME: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NEXT
ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS 55 (2008), available at http://www.2009transition.org/criminal
justice/ (last visited July 20, 2009) [hereinafter SMART ON CRIME]. INS detainees, pre-trial inmates,
and contractual boarders, which includes prisoners housed by the BOP but sentenced under the
authority of any state or the United States military, are statutorily precluded from program
participation. Alan Ellis & J. Michael Henderson, Reducing Recidivism: The Bureau of Prisons
Comprehensive
Residential
Drug
Abuse
Program
1,
3,
available
at
http://www.alanellis.com/CM/Publications/reducing-recidivism.pdf. 28 C.F.R. Parts 545–550
(Jan. 14, 2009) (D.C. non-violent Code offenders eligible for RDAP and its sentence
reduction).The BOP also excludes from participation all those with a detainer. U.S. D EP ’ T
OF J USTICE , F ED . B UREAU OF P RISONS , S UBSTANCE A BUSE T REATMENT FAQ S , available at
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was small, in part because the rigorous program did not provide any
incentives for participation.88 Even when the BOP began to offer some
rewards in the form of goods and performance pay awards,89 the number of
participants remained small.90
The number increased dramatically after passage of the 1994 Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act which provided up to one year
sentence reduction for non-violent inmates who successfully completed the
residential drug abuse treatment program.91 Because a large number of
inmates fulfill the program prerequisites, an ever higher number of inmates
have been able to benefit from the program.92 At any point in time, about
six thousand inmates are now enrolled in the RDAP, with an even longer
waiting list.93 The long waitlist combined with the way in which the BOP
administers the program, however, has decreased the resulting sentence
reduction for program participants. As of summer 2008, the average
sentence reduction amounted to only 7.7 months.94
The positive response to the program results from the RDAP being the
only program in the federal prison system that allows for early release
based on program participation. Upon early release, all program
participants will be transferred to a community correctional center (CCC)
for up to six months to participate in a transitional pre-release program,
ideally immediately prior to their release.95
http://www.bop.gov/inmate_programs/substanceabuse_faqs.jsp (last visited July 15, 2009).
88. Ellis, Henderson & Feldman, supra note 85, at 36.
89. See 28 C.F.R. § 550.57 (2009) (outlining current incentives other than early release).
90. BUREAU OF PRISONS, 1997 SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT PROGRAM IN THE FEDERAL
BUREAU OF PRISONS, REPORT TO CONGRESS, AS REQUIRED BY THE VIOLENT CRIME CONTROL AND
LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1994, at 12 (stating that as of 1993, approximately 1,100 inmates had
participated).
91. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B) (2006). The legislation also required the BOP to provide such
treatment for all “eligible” inmates, which the BOP subsequently defined as all those with a
verifiable and documented drug, alcohol, or prescription abuse problem. Id. § 3621(e)(5)(B). See
also BOP Program Statement 533.02 (changes in eligibility for some offenders).
92. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS ANNUAL REPORT ON
SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT PROGRAMS FISCAL YEAR 2007, REPORT TO CONGRESS 11 (2008)
[hereinafter FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, ANNUAL SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT PROGRAMS REPORT
2007] (stating that in fiscal year 2007, almost five thousand inmates received the sentence
reduction; a total of almost twenty-eight thousand inmates have received the sentence reduction in
the last dozen years). Pre-sentence data from fiscal years 2002 and 2003 indicate that approximately
forty percent of federal inmates meet the substance abuse disorder criteria. See U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE FEASIBILITY OF FEDERAL DRUG COURTS 6 (2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/pdf/drug_court_study.pdf [hereinafter FEASIBILITY OF FEDERAL DRUG
COURTS REPORT].
93. Ellis, Henderson & Feldman, supra note 85, at 38–39. The Bureau of Prisons, however,
reported a substantially higher participation number of inmates in 2007, without any indication of
the existence of a waitlist. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, ANNUAL SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT
PROGRAMS REPORT 2007, supra note 92, at 11.
94. SMART ON CRIME, supra note 87, at 55.
95. Ellis, Henderson & Feldman, supra note 85, at 36.
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The RDAP is based on the assumption that drug and alcohol addiction
are intimately connected to offending, even if the precise correlation
remains contested. In any event, it is generally accepted that “drug
dependence can amplify the offending rates of people whose circumstances
may already predispose them to crime.”96 Once the addiction has been
broken, reform and rehabilitation of the offender proceed more smoothly,
so as to decrease future offending and ultimately enhance public safety.97
The goal is to turn the offender into a productive member of society by
providing a cognitive transformation.
C. “Good Time” in the States
Not unlike the patchwork in our state and federal sentencing regimes
generally, good time awards continue to vary dramatically between states.
In some states, good time is tied to the length of time served, with longer
sentences meriting larger amounts of good time.98 In others, good time may
be linked to prior record and current offense.99 New Mexico’s good time
policy, for example, continues to be strikingly different from the federal
policy. Up until 1999, offenders served on average only about half the time
imposed, with variations between offenders based on the offense of
conviction.100 Today’s Earned Meritorious Deductions statutory policy
assesses the allowable deduction based on solely the offense of conviction.
For example, serious violent offenders receive only up to four days of
credit for every thirty days served, which means they will serve at least
85% of the sentence imposed.101 Most other offenders, excluding parole
violators, receive up to thirty days for thirty days served.102 Credits may be
forfeited but may also be restored.103 In addition, offenders may earn a
“bonus” award for successful completion of select types of
programming.104
Illinois subscribes to a similar regime. Violent offenders are eligible for
up to only 4.5 days of good conduct credit for each month of an
96. Tim McSweeney et al., Twisting Arms or a Helping Hand? Assessing the Impact of
“Coerced” and Comparable “Voluntary” Drug Treatment Options, 47 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 470,
470 (2007).
97. While debate continues as to whether coerced drug treatment is as effective as voluntary
treatment, a substantial number of studies indicate that even coerced treatment results in
“considerable and sustained reductions in reported substance use, injecting risk and offending
behaviours.” Id. at 485.
98. Jacobs, supra note 33, at 229–30.
99. Id.
100. USEEM ET AL., supra note 45, at 6.
101. NEW MEXICO SENTENCING COMM’N, TIME SERVED IN NEW MEXICO PRISONS, FY 2008:
ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF EARNED MERITORIOUS DEDUCTIONS 2 (Oct. 2008).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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imprisonment sentence.105 Most prisoners, however, receive one day of
good conduct credit for each day of their sentence.106 In addition,
successful completion of an educational or substance abuse program or
prison industry work assignment may lead to further reduction of the
length of a prison sentence.107
New York created an extensive Merit Time Program in 1997. Inmates
who are serving prison time for non-violent offenses can earn up to a onesixth reduction of their sentence. To be eligible, inmates must not have run
afoul of disciplinary rules and must either have obtained a GED or a
vocational training certificate, participated in alcohol or drug counseling,
or performed community service as member of a community work crew.108
Drug offenders are eligible for an additional one-sixth decrease in their
time if they fulfill two of these requirements or work release.109 The
program has led to substantial savings in corrections costs in New York
State.110
Good time may be credited as a whole at the beginning of a prison
term—making its revocation a punishment rather than a reward for good
behavior—or may be credited as it is earned, yearly, quarterly, or
monthly.111 The award of good time, as well as its revocation, rests largely
with prison officials, and may vary substantially.112 Under BOP and state
regulations, inmates who have been sanctioned for violating prison
disciplinary rules may lose all or part of their good time credits.113 The
United States Supreme Court has held some minimal due process
protections to apply to proceedings based on which offenders lose good
time.114 Such a holding indicates the importance of good time to prisoners
105.
106.
107.
108.

730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-3(a)(1)–(2) (2008).
Id.
730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-3-(a)(4) (2008).
STATE OF NEW YORK—DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, MERIT TIME PROGRAM
SUMMARY—OCTOBER 1997–DECEMBER 2006 1 (Aug. 2007).
109. Id. at 2.
110. Id. at ii. For a further update on release data, see STATE OF NEW YORK–DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, MERIT TIME PROGRAM SUMMARY—APRIL 2007–SEPTEMBER 2007 (Apr.
2008).
111. Jacobs, supra note 33, at 224–25.
112. See USEEM ET AL., supra note 45, at 10.
113. Some state systems revoke good time also for other reasons: Thirteen states allow for
forfeiture of good time if inmates file frivolous lawsuits. In Missouri, that forfeiture provision
explicitly includes situations in which inmates had asked for DNA testing which confirmed their
guilt. Tonja Jacobi & Gwndolyn Carroll, Acknowledging Guilt: Forcing Self-Identification in PostConviction DNA Testing, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 263, 292 (2008). FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS 2008, at 14 (2008).
114. For a detailed account on the due process analysis in one state, see Jeremy J. Overbey,
Comment: The Texas Department of Criminal Justice—Institutional Division: Controlling and
Disciplining Society’s Inmate Population, 4 TEX. TECH J. ADMIN. L. 257 (2003). See Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563–66 (1974) (stating that evolving and flexible due process
protections require in this context “advance written notice of the claimed violation and a written
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and their reliance on its existence. Nevertheless, opposition to good time
continues. Some has come from academics, some from politicians who
object to the “leniency” created by good time, and some from practitioners.
D. Rejecting Good Time
Good time is open to the same criticism as indeterminate sentencing,
and some sentencing reformers have rejected it for similar reasons.115
Nevertheless, many of the early sentencing reformers in the state systems
included generous good time provisions in their proposals and reforms.116
Good time injects a certain level of uncertainty into the length of the
sentence to be served, thereby undermining the initial judicial sentencing
decision. The uncertainty created “deprives a prisoner of the incentive to
prepare seriously for release and fosters self-defeating despair.”117
Typically, back-end discretion is virtually invisible and prison officials
are substantially less accountable than judges.118 Moreover, earned good
time poses particular issues if work assignments or program spaces are
insufficient.119 It may also be problematic if correction rules preclude
certain offenders from participating in rehabilitative programs even though
they would be statutorily eligible.120 Revocation of good time appears
particularly subject to abuse unless it vests at some point or can only be
revoked in part.121
Because good time laws serve at least one specific purpose
(independent of any finding of rehabilitation), Pierce O’Donnell and his
co-authors suggest replacing good time with a modified early release
program. Early release would depend on the BOP’s evaluation of the
inmate’s “institutional conduct and performance,” but would be limited to
one-tenth of the sentence.122 Should the BOP find the inmate unsuitable for
early release, it would be required to hold a hearing to provide the inmate
statement of the fact-finders as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary
action taken”); id. at 566 (stating inmate is also “allowed to call witnesses and present documentary
evidence in his defense when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional
safety or correctional goals”); id. at 570–71 (stating the inmate is entitled to the right to assistance
in preparing and presenting a defense at least under some circumstances; the decision-maker must
be “sufficiently impartial”). In a later case, Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. Walpole v. Hill, 472
U.S. 445 (1985), the Court required that “there be some evidence to support the findings made in
the disciplinary hearing.” Id. at 457.
115. See O’DONNELL ET AL., supra note 41, at 56, 68; Jacobs, supra note 33, at 243.
116. Greene, supra note 38, at 47–48.
117. O’DONNELL ET AL., supra note 41, at 68.
118. Jacobs, supra note 33, at 218–19.
119. Id. at 235.
120. See, e.g., Nora V. Demleitner, Terms of Imprisonment: Tracking the Noncitizen Offender
Equality, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 174 (2009) (critiquing exclusion of offenders with immigration
detainer from RDAP program).
121. Jacobs, supra note 33, at 238–39.
122. O’DONNELL ET AL., supra note 41, at 70.
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with an opportunity to present his case for early release once the inmate has
completed three-fourths of his sentence.123
Such limited good time would allow for the existence of some
disciplinary mechanism while maintaining the focus on the sentence’s
retributive character.124 However, no evidence exists that prison officials
could not use other discretionary programs to reward good conduct or
penalize violations of prison rules.125 And, in fact, some already do.126
Others argue that good time is inappropriate if viewed as an indicator of
rehabilitation because compliance with prison rules does not predict
recidivism.127 Moreover, incentive-based program participation fails to
indicate moral improvement, or necessarily lead to it. In addition, some
have criticized the use of good time to encourage participation in
rehabilitative programs.128
Much of the criticism of good time has been based on the assumption
that sentences are too long and need to be shortened as part of a sentence
reform movement. Since the publication of such criticism thirty years ago,
sentences have lengthened further rather than shortened, and the number of
people incarcerated has sky-rocketed. The political pressure to increase
sentence length has been almost relentless, and the number of prisoners as
well as the amount of time they serve has increased dramatically since
those pre-reform days. This reality, however, seems to have been only
insufficiently considered in the current version of the Model Penal Code:
Sentencing. To be considered a true “model,” designed to revolutionize
sentencing, it should start from much lower sentence lengths which would
allow for a theoretically and practically based re-thinking of good time. If it
is, on the other hand, to some extent grounded in present reality, it should
also focus on the most recent—albeit limited—work on the success of
rehabilitative and work programs, so as to inform good time decisions.
E. Good Time in the Model Penal Code: Sentencing Drafts
An early draft of the Model Penal Code: Sentencing indicated generous
amounts of good time, up to 20% each for good conduct, program
123. Id.
124. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF INCARCERATION, DOING JUSTICE: THE
CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 101–02 (1976) (indicating that 10% to 15% of good time would be
acceptable).
125. Jacobs, supra note 33, at 258–59.
126. Rewards other than good time may include furloughs, transfers to lower-security units or
prison facilities, or monetary awards. Jacobs, supra note 33, at 242. The experience in the early
years of RDAP, however, may contradict this claim as only substantial good time credits increased
the number of applicants dramatically. Demleitner, supra note 120, at 175. Rather than sanctioning
an individual with the loss of good time, placement in solitary confinement or a special control unit
may have a more specific and general deterrent effect. See Jacobs, supra note 33, at 258.
127. Jacobs, supra note 33, at 264.
128. NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 18, 49 (1974).
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participation, and extraordinary service.129 However, such large sentence
reductions would have dramatically enhanced the discretion of prison
officials, who are largely unaccountable to the public. A later draft seemed
to settle on 15% of good time for good conduct, with another 15% being
awarded for “extraordinary service, such as saving a life or assisting in
recapturing an escaped inmate.”130
The latest draft now provides for good time for good conduct at a
minimum amount of 15%. Since the 15% reduction would be presumed,
prisoners could lose such good time only if they commit a criminal offense
or “a serious violation of the rules of the institution,” or if they “failed to
participate satisfactorily in work, education, or other rehabilitation
programs.”131 A presumption of a good time reduction may not only be
easier to administer but may also carry a symbolic effect on the prisoner
who is presumed to be able to follow rules and regulations, which may
indicate a societal belief in his rehabilitation. The reason for the relatively
limited amount of good time now available is again to avoid back-end
discretion.
Good time that continues to be provided allows prison authorities to
exercise some “authority over prison durations as a tool to manage the inprison behavior of inmates.”132 However, there is only limited explanation
for the choice of 15% as the minimum amount of good time states should
award. While federal law and some states have adopted a 15% rule, the
commentary notes that “no data exist for derivation of an optimum
formula.”133 The Model Penal Code: Sentencing in its current form does
not adopt a vesting rule; however, in the commentary, it provides language
for one. Currently, good time does not vest in any state.
IV. FRAMING GOOD TIME IN THE CURRENT SENTENCING
CONTEXT
The United States prison system has grown dramatically in the last
twenty years. Today, state and federal authorities hold over two million
people. The BOP incarcerates over two hundred thousand prisoners134
which makes it the largest jailer in the United States. The federal prison
system has grown at least three times as fast as state systems within the last
decade, and costs about five billion dollars a year.135 It has particularly long
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING (Preliminary Draft No. 5, 2007).
MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING (Preliminary Draft No. 6, 2008).
MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING §§ 305.1(2)(a), (b) (Council Draft No. 2, 2008).
Id. § 305.1 cmt. a.
Id. § 305.1 cmt. b.
SCOTT D. CAMP & GERALD G. GAES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS,
GROWTH AND QUALITY OF U.S. PRIVATE PRISONS: EVIDENCE FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY 2 & n.3
(2001), available at http://www.bop.gov/news/research_projects/published_reports/pub_vs_priv/
oreprres_note.pdf.
135. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE FEDERAL PRISON POPULATION: A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 1,
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sentences for non-violent offenders. For drug offenses committed between
the early nineties and the following decade, the average time to be served
has increased by almost one-third, from 32.7 months to 42.9 months.136
Starting in the 1960s, as crime became a salient political issue,
legislators increasingly clamored for longer sentences and increased
harshness toward offenders. The tide, however, appears to have turned,
especially in light of tight state budgets and enhanced emphasis on public
safety which mandates long prison terms only for those who constitute an
active threat or are believed to do so—a determination usually based on a
combination of the offense of conviction and the offender’s prior criminal
record. Public opinion polls indicate that people support education and job
training programs for inmates to prepare them for release. According to
polls, three-quarters of the public also favor early release for prisoners who
have participated in such programs, largely because they view such
prisoners as unlikely to recidivate.137 Thus, the public will support
programs that rehabilitate offenders and therefore enhance public safety,
and is willing to reward those who participate in such programming.
All sentencing and corrections regimes exist to protect numerous goals
and values, which include equal treatment, autonomy, participation,
transparency, and legitimacy.138 Good time can assist in achieving these
goals when constructed carefully and when designed to provide a sufficient
incentive.
Good time should fall into two categories. One category should be tied
to satisfactory behavior, with a relatively small amount of good time
sufficient to incentivize such behavior. While some criticize this
requirement as minimal,139 prison inmates are convicted for running afoul
of societal rules. Therefore, they deserve some credit, albeit limited, for
complying with rules.
The second category should be tied to whether they have achieved a
goal that is crucial to their future rehabilitation and social reintegration,
such as drug treatment, or an educational or vocational achievement.140
This is especially the case if program success indicates a substantial
cognitive change from earlier thinking. If good time is tied to program
3, available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/sl_fedprisonpopulation.pdf; U.S.
COURTS, COSTS OF INCARCERATION AND SUPERVISED RELEASE, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/newsroom/2008/costs.cfm (last visited July 14, 2009).
136. THE 2009 CRIMINAL JUSTICE TRANSITION COAL., PRISON INCENTIVES AND MANAGEMENT:
IMPROVE PRISON MANAGEMENT BY EXPANDING PRISONERS’ GOOD CONDUCT CREDITS (2008),
available at http://2009transition.org/criminaljustice/index.php?view=article&catid=20%3Achap
ter-fourteen-sentencing-reform-&id=51%3Ax-incentives-and-sentencing-management&format=
pdf&option=com_content&Itemid=104.
137. PETER D. HART RESEARCH ASSOCS., OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE, CHANGING PUBLIC
ATTITUDES TOWARD THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 13 (2002).
138. TONRY, supra note 8, at 5–7.
139. SOLVING CALIFORNIA’S CORRECTIONS CRISIS, supra note 35, at 25.
140. See id. at 25–26.
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participation, sufficient seats must be available in such programs, so as not
to randomly exclude otherwise eligible offenders. Such exclusions would
necessarily lead to inequities and resulting difficulties in managing an
institution.
If opportunities to earn good time are equally available, correctional
goals will be fulfilled. Autonomy aims at “leaving people alone” but at the
same time holding them responsible for their decisions. While
imprisonment has often been charged with infantilizing offenders, the
ability to earn good time through personal choices and behavior restores
some autonomy to inmates. It restores the inmates’ opportunity to believe
in their ability to operate as independent actors. This is especially true if
the programming decisions become part of the offender’s pre-release plan,
so that every step on the way toward release either shortens the time to
release or improves the conditions of the inmate’s confinement.
Despite the fact that participation rights in sentencing and release
decisions have begun to include victims and their focus on the offender has
diminished to some extent, imprisonment should be addressed differently.
Imprisonment deals solely with the offender and his punishment. During
that time, offenders should play an active part in their rehabilitation and
participate in shaping their future. Efforts that resemble those of a lawabiding person—following rules—should be rewarded; any action beyond
that—employment and especially efforts at education and treatment—
should merit even greater reward, with the goal of testing the depth of the
attitudinal change as soon as feasible.
Transparency of this good time regime could be assured to some extent
through clear-cut but sufficiently flexible guideline-like rules that
determine what merits a discount and how much of a discount to award.
The construction of such a regime should rely less on currently existing
rules, which do not appear scientifically founded but rather use
pedagogical literature to assess how time discounts effect rule compliance,
goal setting, and achievement in other educational settings. Whether 12%
to 15% is the appropriate discount for good conduct and for program
success may be more easily answerable in light of the pedagogical
literature. While different states provide us with distinct models, their
experiences may be less important as neither selective programming nor
thoughtful use of good time are likely to have occurred in most states. It
may be precisely this laboratory of states, however, that may allow us to
determine discount rates more likely to achieve our societal goals of
offender rehabilitation and crime prevention.
Such transparency is also crucial because extensive use of good time
will be challenged by victims and the public alike. After all, the time
imposed in court may appear irrelevant if it will subsequently be cut in half
by prison officials. Such decrease in the time served should be defensible
on grounds other than merely “good behavior.” The extensive type of
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programming envisioned here would make it more defensible.
In light of the long prison sentences many inmates currently serve, good
time should become irrevocable at a point to avoid the ongoing threat of
loss of good time credits. Surely prison systems have other, more
immediate and harsher sanctions available should serious misconduct
occur.
Fair procedures in awarding and taking away good time will be crucial
in establishing the legitimacy of the system to inmates and the public. The
procedures should be transparent to the extent possible. Extraordinary
behavior in the form of saving a prison guard or preventing an effort at
escape or rioting should not be rewarded within this good time regime.
Because of its rare nature, it might be appropriate to allow for judicial
action at that point, giving the court an opportunity to re-assess a sentence
in light of such unique conduct.
V. THE FUTURE: A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
The proposed expansion of good time and its re-thinking is justified, at
least in part, by the current length of prison sentences in the United States.
The entire good time regime should be reviewed if our sentence lengths
begin to decrease.141 Until that point, however, good time is crucial for
prison management and as a symbol of hope and rehabilitative potential in
an overly harsh penal regime. A discount of up to one-third of the sentence
judicially imposed may capture these goals appropriately. Good time, after
all, encompasses the power of the law to ‘“create, alter, distort, or even
destroy time itself, not simply our experience of it.”’142 My proposal allows
inmates to regain some control over time, control that usually escapes any
prisoner. It puts them in charge of their own fate by choosing compliance,
and especially by preparing themselves for release. With re-entry becoming
a mantra in recent years, which is crucial for the reintegration of the
thousands of inmates who will be released annually, good time incentives,
combined with enhanced prison programming, could help facilitate
adjustment to life on the outside and help decrease recidivism. Thus, good
time can become a valuable tool not only for prison administrators in
keeping control, but also for the inmate and society in achieving our goals
of cutting prison time, saving costs associated with imprisonment, and
decreasing the number of future crimes.

141. For an analysis of the increase in the time served by federal inmates, see WILLIAM J.
SABOL & JOHN MCGREADY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, TIME SERVED IN
PRISON BY FEDERAL OFFENDERS 1986–97 (1999).
142. Rebecca R. French, Time in the Law, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 663, 693 (2001) (citing
Jonathan D. Kramer).

